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SHIP'S LIABILITY TO LONGSHOREMEN BASED ON
UNSEAWORTHINESS-SIERACKI
THROUGH USNER*
James A. George**
INTRODUCTION

Built upon historical foundations attacked as faulty and erroneous by Supreme Court Justices,' leading commentators 2 and
authorities3 in the field of admiralty and maritime law, the
Sieracki 4 extension of the protection of the warranty of seaworthiness to longshoremen and other harbor workers has experienced great stimulus in recent years. An example of this growth
is seen in the cases of Law v. Victory Carriers,Inc.5 and Chagois
v. Lykes Brothers Steamship Co.,6 extending the warranty of
seaworthiness a considerable distance beyond the vessel, whether
or not the injury-causing instrumentality was an appliance or
appurtenance (either temporary or permanent) of the ship.
The process has not been all growth-oriented, however, for
on January 25, 1971, the United States Supreme Court limited the
scope of remedies previously existing in favor of the longshoremen by handing down its decision in Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp.7 which eliminated the so-called "instantaneous unseaworthiness" action.
This Article will briefly discuss the historical development
of the basic principles involved, a growth process which has
caused Judge Moore of the Second Circuit to observe that "unseaworthiness may have become a term of art wholly unrelated
* Adapted from Mr. George's article appearing in the October, 1971 issue
JOURNAL OF MARITIME LAW AND COMMERCE (3 J. OF MARITIME L. & CoM.
45), and published with the permission of the editorial staff of that publication.
** Member, Baton Rouge Bar.

of the

1. Dissent of Justices Stewart and Harlan in Jackson v. Lykes Bros.
S.S. Co., 386 U.S. 731, 736 (1967).
2. See, e.g., Shields & Byrne, Application of the "Unseaworthiness" Doctrine to Longshoremen, 111 U. PENN. L. REV. 1137 (1963). This article contains

an exhaustive survey of both modern and ancient history indicating, according to the author, that the duties of loading and unloading were always
entrusted to specialists other than members of the vessel's crew.
3. See, NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES, § 15 at 30-31 (2d ed. 1966).
4. Seas Shipping Co., Inc. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
5. 432 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1970).
6. 432 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1970).
7. 91 S.Ct. 514 (1971).
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to reality." 8 Emphasis will be placed upon recent decisions and
an effort will be made to discern some guidelines from these cases
as to the future course of these remedies.9
HISTORICAL

BASIS

OF THE DOCTRINE

OF LIABILITY

BASED

UPON UNSEAWORTHINESS

The Supreme Court's 1903 decision in The Osceola'0 is generally regarded as the modern-day" fountainhead for the doctrine of ship's liability based upon the vessel's unseaworthiness.
In its much-quoted "second proposition," the Court stated "[t]hat
the vessels and her owner are, both by English and American
law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received by seamen in
consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to
supply and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to
12
the ship.'
However, the process of "complete divorcement of unseaworthiness liability from concepts of negligence," reinforced in
the 1971 decision of Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp.,18 had
a "humble origin as a dictum in an obscure case in 1922," Carlisle
Packing Co. v. Sandanger,14 where the Supreme Court stated:
"[W]e think the trial court might have told the jury that
8. Tarabocchia v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., 417 F.2d 476 (2d Cir. 1969).
This case Involved a reluctant application of the now discarded "operational negligence" action. See text accompanying note 123 infra.
9. This article will not treat the provisions of the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Act or the recent developments affecting jurisdiction of
that Act connected with the decision of the United States Supreme Court In
Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1970). For excellent treatments of these areas, see Donovan, Practicein the Office of the Deputy CommIssioner, 15 LA. BAR J. 117 (1967); McTamaney, The Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers Act of 1927: The Twilight Zone After Nacirema, 1 J. OF
MARITIME L. & CoM. 443 (1970); Note, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (1970); Smith,
On the Waterfront at the Pier's Edge: The Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 114 (1970). Additionally, the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), granting a death action under the general maritime
law will be considered by the author In a subsequent issue of the J. OF
MARITIME L. & CoM. This decision has been extensively treated in other commentary. See, e.g., Note, 31 LA. L. REv. 165 (1970); Note, 49 TEx. L. REV. 128
(1970); Note, 45 TUL. L. REV. 151 (1970).
10. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
11. An exhaustive discussion of the ancient authority upon which this
doctrine is based, beginning with the laws of Oleron, promulgated about
1150 A.D., may be found In the landmark case of Mitchell v. Trawler Racer,
Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 544-45 (1960).
12. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
13. 91 S.Ct. 514 (1971).
14. 259 U.S. 255 (1922).
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without regard to negligence the vessel was unseaworthy
when she left the dock .

.

. and that if thus unseaworthy

and one of the crew received damage as the direct result
thereof, he was entitled to recover compensatory damages."' 5
Subsequent decisions emphasized the absolute nature of this
obligation. In The H. A. Scandrett,0 the Second Circuit demonstrated the independence of these principles from those related
to the duty of the shipowner under the Jones Act 1 7 to exercise

reasonable care:
"In our opinion the libellant had a right of indemnity for
injuries arising from an unseaworthy ship even though there
was no means of anticipating trouble.
"The ship is not freed from liability by mere due diligence to render her seaworthy as may be the case under the
Harter Act (46 U.S.C.A. §§ 190-195) where loss results from
faults in navigation, but under the maritime law there is an
absolute obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel and, in
default thereof, liability follows for any injuries caused by
breach of the obligation."' 8
Since 1944, when the Supreme Court decided Mahnich v.
Southern Steamship Co.,' 9 it has been clear that a shipowner is
liable for injuries to seamen caused by unseaworthiness of his
ship or its equipment. Only two years after it decided Mahnich,
the Supreme Court made equally clear that the warranty of seaworthiness provided by the general maritime law extends also
to longshoremen injured on board ship while working in the
service of the ship. This is the Sieracki rule.2° Moreover, it is
now established that as long as the longshoreman is actually
working in the service of the ship, it does not matter that his
injury occurred on shore; the shipowner is still liable for any
unseaworthiness of his vessel that causes the longshoreman's
injury.2' This is the rule of the now famous "bean-bag case,"
Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp., which held that unsea15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 259.
87 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1937).
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
The H. A. Scandrett, 87 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir. 1937).
321 U.S. 96 (1944).
Seas Shipping Co., Inc. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
Gutierrez v. Waterman B.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
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worthiness of a vessel could result from defective cargo packaging which caused an unsafe condition on the dock.
The Court in Gutierrez based admiralty jurisdiction upon
the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 22 and held that "the
duty to provide a seaworthy ship and gear, including cargo containers, applies to longshoremen unloading the ship whether
''28
they are standing aboard ship or on the pier.
The crux of the rule as stated by the Fifth Circuit recently
in its Chagois v. Lykes decision is to the effect that the warranty
of seaworthiness depends not on plaintiff's status or location, but
primarily upon the type of work he does and its relationship to
the ship.2 4 It is now established in most circuits that a great deal
of work connected with loading and unloading the ship is "work
in the ship's service," and any longshoreman injured while load25
ing the ship may avail himself of the unseaworthiness remedy.
The Sieracki rule was based upon what has been called an
erroneous concept, set forth in a 1926 decision of the Supreme
Court,26 that the work of loading and unloading vessels "was a
maritime service formerly rendered by the ship's crew."' A key
to this "most extraordinary expansion"2 8 of the doctrine under
consideration was provided in Sieracki by the following language:
"Historically the work of loading and unloading is the work
of the ship's service, performed until recent times by members of the crew. [Citing cases.] That the owner seeks to
have it done with the advantages of more modern divisions
of labor does not minimize the worker's hazard and should
not nullify his protection."A few years after Sieracki was decided, the protection of the
warranty of seaworthiness was extended beyond the ship to
include longshoremen injured on docks,30 and then to numerous
other classifications of persons such as ship's carpenters, 8 1 elec22. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970).
23. Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 215 (1963).
24. Chagois v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 432 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1970), citing
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
25. Deffes v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 361 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1966).
26. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
27. 272 U.S. 50, 52 (1926), citing Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234
U.S. 52 (1914).
28. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 91 S.Ct. 514 (1971).
29. Seas Shipping Co., Inc. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 96 (1946).
30. Strika v. Netherlands Ministry, 185 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1950).
31. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
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tricians,3 2 ship cleaners, 33 repairmen,3 4 and riggers3 5 who perform
jobs formerly done by seamen.8 6
It should also be briefly noted that the longshoreman is able
to circumvent the exclusive remedy provisions contained in the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act,3 7 basically the same
as that in any other compensation act, by proceeding against his
own employer (if that employer is either the bareboat charterer38
or owner of the vessel) by either an action in rem against the
vessel itself, an action in personam against the vessel owners,
operators and/or charterers, or a combination of these actions. 89
WHAT

IS

"UNSEAWORTIMNESS"?

The Fifth Circuit has set the following general guidelines
by way of definition of the elusive and enigmatic doctrine of
unseaworthiness:
"What is the vessel to do? What are the hazards, the perils,
the forces likely to be incurred? Is the vessel or the particular fitting under scrutiny sufficient to withstand those
anticipated forces? If the answer is in the affirmative, the
vessel (or its fitting) is seaworthy. If the answer is in the
negative, then the vessel (or the fitting) is unseaworthy no
matter how diligent, careful or prudent the owner might
have been."
In Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc.,41 the Supreme Court
characterized the obligation in the following language:
"What has been said is not to suggest that the owner is obligated to furnish an accident-free ship. The duty is absolute,
32. Feinman v. A. H. Bull S.S. Co., 216 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1954).
33. Torres v. The Kastor, 227 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1955); Crawford v. Pope
& Talbot, Inc., 206 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1953).
34. Read v. United States, 201 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1953).
35. Amerocean S.S. Co. v. Copp, 245 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1957).
36. See Note, 75 YALE L.J. 1174, 1183 (1966).
37. 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970).
38. Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963).
39. Jackson v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 386 U.S. 731 (1967).
40. Walker v. Harris, 335 F.2d 185, 191 (5th Cir. 1964), wherein it was also

stated: "Although not articulated in such terms, it is a sort of sea-going res
4psa loquitur. Once it is assumed (or judicially held) that the vessel must
anticipate the particular hazard and be staunch enough to override it, the
only escape from the inference of unseaworthiness is proof that some new,
unforeseen, intervening force or factor brought about the failure of ship or
gear. There is none of that here." Id. at 193.
41. 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960).
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but it is a duty only to furnish a vessel and appurtenances
reasonably fit for their intended use. The standard is not
perfection, but reasonable fitness; not a ship that will weather
every conceivable storm or withstand every imaginable peril
of the sea, but a vessel reasonably suitable for her intended
service."
The most recent attempt by the Supreme Court to delineate
some definitional boundaries is contained in the Usner opinion:
"Trawler Racer involved the defective condition of a physical
part of the ship itself. But our cases have held that the
scope of unseaworthiness is by no means so limited. A
vessel's condition of unseaworthiness might arise from any
number of circumstances. Her gear might be defective, [citing
Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96] her appurtenances in disrepair, [Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S.
85], her crew unfit. [Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348
U.S.. 336]. The number of men assigned to perform a shipboard task might be insufficient. [Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 386 U.S. 724]. The method of loading her cargo,
or the manner of its stowage, might be improper. [A. & G.
Stevedores v. Ellerman Lines, 369 U.S. 355; Gutierrez v.
Waterman S.S. Co., 373 U.S. 206]. For any of these reasons,
or others, a vessel might not be reasonably fit for her in4' 2
tended service.
An analysis of recent decisions reveals several interesting
examples of circumstances which have been deemed to create
unseaworthiness of the vessel. One such condition was found in
Guidry v. Texaco, Inc.,43 where the court found unseaworthiness of the vessel due to quarters which were too cramped for
the proper discharge of plaintiff's duties while pulling copper
tubing in the engine room of the vessel.
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court in Waldron v.
Moore-McCormack Lines,44 held that "to be inadequately and
improperly manned is a classic case of an unseaworthy vessel,"
and found the vessel in that case to be unseaworthy where the
42. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 91 S.Ct. 514, 517-18 (1971).
43. 430 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1970). But see Wilson v. Societa Italiana de
Armemento, 409 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1969), where the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that the mere fact that an area In which a longshoreman
may be obliged to work is cramped or confining does not render the area
unsafe as a matter of law.
44. 886 U.S. 724 (1967); see also June T, Inc. v. King, 290 F.2d 404 (5th
Cir. 1961).
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evidence established that the ship was being operated by a twoman crew where a three-man crew was both customary and
necessary. There have been several applications of this decision
in the past year, including the Fifth Circuit's decision in Dillon
v. M. S. Oriental Inventor.45 In the Dillon case, plaintiff was a
member of a gang storing bales of pulp paper in the lower
'tween deck of the vessel, and his partner on this job had hurt
his knee a short time before Dillon's accident. Later in the day
his partner's knee gave way causing the load to shift and fall
on Dillon. The court found that the impairment of the partner's
knee was a condition which had existed for some time prior to
the injury and that the vessel was rendered unseaworthy by that
condition.
Other examples of unseaworthiness include failure of the
ship's ventilation system which allowed the men and the crew
to be overcome by fumes in the lower hold,46 oil on the engine
room floor where the petitioner was required to work, 47 collapse
of the shore-based movable crane used in connection with the
49
unloading of the vessel,48 collapse of a ladder used by the crew,
and unexplained collapse of cargo stacks in the hold. 50
WHO Is

ENTITLED TO THESE REmEDIES?

Employment Must Be "In Service of the Ship"When isa "Ship" Not a Ship?
Under Sieracki, the warranty of seaworthiness was extended
to shore-based workers engaged in work traditionally that of a
seaman which, of course, requires that the situs of the employment be a "vessel" and that it be "in active maritime service."5 '
45. 426 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1970); see also Moschi v. S.S. Edgar F. Luckenbach, 424 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1970).
46. McInnis v. Hamburg Am. Lines, 317 F. Supp. 1395 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
47. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. United Stevedoring Div., States Marine
Lines, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 1373 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
48. Williams v. Ocean Transp. Lines, Inc., 425 F.2d 1183 (3d Cir. 1970).
49. Shaw v. Lauritzen, 428 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1970).
50. Scott v. S.S. Ciudad de Ibague, 426 F.2d 1105 (5th Cir. 1970); LaCapria
v. Compagnie Maritime Beige, 427 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1970). An exhaustive collection of factual situations under which unseaworthiness has been found
to exist (and also categorizing the few decisions where the vessel was found
to be seaworthy) may be found in NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 54 at
121, 128 (1966). See also Woods, The Law's Concern for Those That Go
Down to the Sea in Ships, 23 ARK. L. REv. 567, 584-90 (1970).

51. West v. United States, 361 U.S. 118 (1959). The question whether the
vessel upon which the injury occurred "is in active maritime service," discussed in this section, is to be distinguished from the separate and distinct
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For instance, in Atkins v. Greenville Shipbuilding Corp.,5 2 the
Fifth Circuit held that a floating dry dock was not a "vessel"
for purposes of the warranty of seaworthiness where its position
was maintained by cables running to the bank, and it was without motive power of its own.
The leading case in this area is West v. United States,5
involving a "Liberty" ship of World War II vintage which had
been taken out of the mothball fleet to be reactivated for the
Korean Conflict. The Court found that at the time of the plaintiff's injury, the vessel was undergoing a complete overhaul, and
held that the ship was therefore not in active maritime service.
The United States Supreme Court stated the test to be one involving "the status of the ship, the pattern of the repairs, and
' '54
the extensive nature of the work contracted to be done.
In several decisions of the Fifth Circuit in the past year,
great weight has been given to the tests dictated by the West
decision, particularly with reference to the extensiveness of the
repairs. Several of these decisions including Baum v. United
States5 5 and Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co."6 have held that the
vessels in question were "dead ships" and that no warranty of
seaworthiness was available to the plaintiffs.5 *
Employment Must Be "Work Traditionally Done by Seamen"
The second part of the double test is whether the person in
area relating to injuries to shipyard employees caused by conditions over
which the shipowner had no control and which formed a part of the repair
contract.
52. 411 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1969), cert denied, 396 U.S. 846 (1969); see also
Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625 (1887); Russell v. Greenville
Shipbuilding Corp., 428 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1970); Gretna Machine and Iron
Works, Inc. v. Neuman, 316 F. Supp. 147 (E.D. La. 1970); Kelso Marine, Inc.
v. Hollis, 316 F. Supp. 1271 (S.D. Tex. 1970); American Mutual Liab. Ins. Co.
v. Neuman, 318 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Ala. 1969); Snyder v. A Floating Dry Dock,
22 F. Supp. 685 (D.C. N.J. 1884).
53. 361 U.S. 118, 122 (1959); see also Roper v. United States, 368 U.S.
20 (1961).
54. West v. United States, 361 U.S. 118 (1959).
55. 427 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1970).
56. 431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970).
57. See also Delome v. Union Barge Line Co., 444 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1971);
Johnson v. Oil Transp. Co., Inc., 440 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1971); Parker v. Cargill, Inc., 417 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1969); McCown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 405
F.2d 596 (4th Cir. 1969); Vessella v. United States, 405 F.2d 599 (4th Cir.
1969); Moye v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 402 F.2d 238 (5th
Cir. 1968); cert. denied, 395 U.S. 913 (1969); Lawlor v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
Inc., 275 F.2d 599 (2nd Cir. 1960); Allen v. Union Barge Line Corp., 239 F.
Supp. 1004 (E.D. La. 1965).
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question is performing work "traditionally" done by seamen.
In most cases, although the "dead ship" defense may not be
available to the shipowner, it is found as a fact that the work
which was being done by the injured person is of such a highly
specialized nature that it was never performed by a seaman.
Under this finding, of course, the vessel does not afford the warranty of seaworthiness under the Sieracki rule. In a recent Fifth
Circuit decision on this question, the facts indicated that the
Esso Jamestown required repairs to a main bearing while in the
Port of Baton Rouge. A welding crew was called out to the ship,
and the plaintiff's injury was caused while his repair crew was
in the process of working on the bearing. While the question of
the Esso Jamestown being a "dead ship" played no part in the
decision, the Fifth Circuit held that the ship's warranty of seaworthiness did not extend to non-crew members regarding transitory conditions created by an outside repair crew during the
course of substantial repairs to an existing unseaworthy condition where the transitory condition relates to the subject matter of the repair contract. 58 In another Fifth Circuit decision,
the injured person was found to have been performing a highly
specialized service aboard the vessel, and the court held that
shipowners did not owe the plaintiff the warranty of seaworthiness. However, the lower court award of $160,000 was affirmed
on a finding that the shipowner was negligent.19
Two decisions handed down by the Fourth Circuit in 196960
dealt with the question of whether a marine electrician and a
sandblasting operator were owed the warranty of seaworthiness;
the court decided that these persons contributed services of such
a highly specialized nature that the warranty of seaworthiness
could not be extended to them. One decision,"' however, left
the door open for the plaintiff to go back to the trial court to
58. Patterson v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 423 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1970). But

see Allen v. Union Barge Line Corp., 239 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. La. 1965), aff'd,
361 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967), where a shipfitter was accorded protection of the warranty while working on a propeller

of a vessel on the ways. The court found the vessel was in navigation and
that plaintiff was performing work traditionally done by seamen.
59. Drake v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 432 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1970).

It is to be noted that in this case the court made an express finding that the
vessel was in navigation. Id. at 278.
60. McCown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 405 F.2d 596 (4th Cir. 1969); Vessella v. United States, 405 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1969).
61. McCown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 405 F.2d 596 (4th Cir. 1969).
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attempt to prove a maritime tort action against the shipowner.6 2
These decisions are based upon the Halecki decision, decided
by the United States Supreme Court in 1959, in which the test
was set forth that the entire repair job should be examined
rather than only the part in which the injured person was working.6
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

EXPANDING RIGHTS OF LONGSHOREMEN
Expansion of Terms "Loading" and "Unloading"
The Fifth Circuit has made clear in the Chagois and Law
cases0 4 that it will extend the "humanitarian policy which
underlies the doctrine" set out in the Sieracki case liberally and
to a considerable distance from the vessel itself. A similar decision was rendered recently by the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania in the Byrd case, 65 in which the petitioner and another longshoreman were trying to move a forklift
truck, intended to be loaded aboard the defendant's vessel as
cargo, from the back to the front of the pier. The men were using
another forklift truck to perform this task and as the plaintiff
was trying to attach a tow to the forklift truck to be used to tow
the cargo, he was caught between the two and injured. The
court rejected the shipowner's argument that the activity in
which plaintiff was engaged on the pier was not the actual loading operation of the ship. As in the recent Fifth Circuit decisions,
the court deciding Byrd rejected a restrictive interpretation of
the term "loading" and stated the test to be whether or not
plaintiff's actions at the time of the accident were "direct, neces66
sary steps in the physical transfer" of the cargo in question.
As noted above, Sieracki set the cast for later decisions in
this area and paved the way for such results as those reached
in Byrd, Chagois and Law by its instruction that the longshoreman's protection should not be nullified by "more modern divi62. Id. at 599.
63. United New York & New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots Assn. v. Halecki,
358 U.S. 613 (1959).
64. Chagois v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 432 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1970); Law v.
Victory Carriers, Inc., 432 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1970).
65. Byrd v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 1207
(E.D. Penn. 1969).
66. Id. at 1208, citing Litwinowicz S.S. Co. v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 179
F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Penn. 1959).
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sions of labor."6 7 When Gutierrez"" subsequently moved unseaworthiness ashore by introducing "unbeanworthiness" into the
law, few inhibiting barriers remained to such extensions as those
created in the recent decisions.
The pattern of opening the Sieracki umbrella to cover an
expanding group of persons and factual situations was continued
with the Supreme Court's decision in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v.
Hawn.6 9 There the Court extended Sieracki's protection to a
ship's carpenter, holding that application of the warranty of seaworthiness depended not upon plaintiff's status or location, but
primarily upon the type of work he does and its relationship to
the ship.
A direct application of the Court's qualification in Sieracki
was made in Rodriguez v. Coastal Ship Corp.70 where the longshoreman was injured aboard ship while attempting to open a
hatch during the loading operation. He had slipped on oil which
had dripped from an overhead gantry crane. The vessel involved
in Rodriguez was in an experimental stage and the shipowner
argued that the doctrine announced in Sieracki was a "relative
concept" and that the experimental vessel was "reasonably fit
for its intended service." Quoting from Sieracki, the court said
that the costs of experimental activities were to be borne by the
shipowner, not the longshoreman, and that therefore the doctrine
of seaworthiness applied.
Several years prior to Gutierrez the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania had already "moved the warranty of seaworthiness ashore" in Litwinowicz v. Weyerhaeuser
Steamship Co. 7 1 There, two longshoremen were injured while
working in a railroad gondola car situated on the pier alongside
the vessel. They were injured while attaching a piece of equipment provided by the stevedore 72 to a load of steel beams. This
67. Seas Shipping Co., Inc. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
68. Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963), recently described by Chief Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit as "a beanworthy case."
Burrage v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 431 F.2d 1229, 1231 (5th Cir.,
1970). See also Note, 2 J. oF MAmrnmE L. & CoM. 871 (1971).
69. 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
70. 210 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. N.Y. 1962).
71. 179 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Penn. 1959).
72. Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have established the rule
that the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness extends to equipment supplied by the stevedore. Alaska S.S. Co., Inc. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954),
aff'g per curiam, 205 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1953); Rogers v. United States Lines,
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case allowed recovery over an argument that plaintiffs were
merely preparing the cargo for handling, and made the following
oft-quoted observation:
"The term loading is not a word of art, and is not to be
narrowly and hypertechnically interpreted. Plaintiffs' actions at the time of the accident were direct, necessary steps
in the physical transfer of the steel from the railroad car
into the vessel, which constituted the work of loading.""
Several Third Circuit decisions 74 and a Ninth Circuit decision all applied the warranty of seaworthiness to longshoremen
injured in the loading or unloading process. In Spann v. Lauritzen,"6 a longshoreman was engaged in operating the control lever
of a hopper situated on a pier in which nitrate of soda would be
dumped from the ship's hold by a large crane. Hagans v. Ellerman & Bucknall Steamship Co.77 went one step further as the
plaintiff there was in a warehouse unloading bags of sand from
a flat truck into which they had been off-loaded from the vessel
in an earlier stage of the operation. Thompson v. Calmar Steamship Corp.7 8 involved facts similar to Litwinowicz in that plaintiff was injured while helping unload a railroad gondola car on
the pier. However, ship's equipment was directly attached to
the gondola car in Thompson, whereas no ship's gear was directly
involved in Litwinowicz.
75

79
Of this group of cases, only Huff v. Matson Navigation Co. ,
involved an injury aboard a vessel, but the instrumentality causing the injury was not part of the ship's gear although it was
temporarily attached to the vessel at the time of the accident.
The equipment involved in the Huff decision was a "scraper"
used to drag sugar from the side of the hold to a pile where it
could be picked up by scoops on a "marine leg," or conveyor
mechanism. The court, after a comprehensive review of authori-

347 U.S. 984 (1954) rev'g per curiam, 205 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1953); see also
Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Naviazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S.
315 (1964).
73. Litwinowicz v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 179 F. Supp. 812, 817-18 (E.D.
Penn. 1959).
74. Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1965); Thompson v. Calmar
S.S. Corp., 331 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1964); Hagans v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S.
Co., 318 F.2d 563 (3d Cir. 1963);
75. Huff v. Matson Navigation Co., 338 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1964).
76. 344 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1965).
77. 318 F.2d 563 (3d Cir. 1963).
78. 331 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1964).
79. 338 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1964).
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ties, reversed the district court's ruling against plaintiff, holding
that he was engaged in ship's service and was thus entitled to
the warranty of seaworthiness.
Against this background, the Fifth Circuit first joined those
circuits giving liberal application to the warranty of seaworthiness in 1966 with its decision in Deffes v. Federal Barge Lines,
Inc.8 0 Plaintiff was aboard the Barge FBL 625 assisting in the
unloading of grain with the use of a shore-based "marine leg."
At the time of his injury, plaintiff was sweeping grain into the
"marine leg" which was resting on the bottom of the barge,
although it was not permanently attached to the vessel. Relying
primarily upon Huff v. Matson Navigation Co., the Fifth Circuit
rejected the minority view of the Second and Sixth Circuits in
the cases of Forkin v. Furness, Withy & Co. 8' and McKnight v.
Paterson & Sons, Ltd.,8 2 and held that "a defective marine leg
'83
used in unloading grain makes a barge unseaworthy.
The Huff opinion closely scrutinized the minority view limiting the extension of the warranty, and stated in part:
"It seems apparent that the departure of McKnight and Forkin from the settled principles of the cases decided by the
Supreme Court, by writing into their decisions exceptions
neither found nor suggested in any Supreme Court case,
is due to the rejection by the opinions in McKnight and
Forkin of the rationale of Sieracki and of the cases which
' 4
have flowed from it."
Moreover, while the Huff opinion did note some factual distinctions between the situation there involved and that in the
Forkin case, it declined to base its result upon any such distinction. Instead it refused to follow Forkin on "the broader ground
that the basic theory there applied is manifestly wrong and
contrary to the controlling decisions, as noted in the dissenting
opinion in that case." 85
80. 361 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1966).
81. 323 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1963).
82. 181 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Ohio 1960), af'cd, 286 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1960).
83. Deffes v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 361 F.2d 422, 427 (5th Cir. 1966).
84. 338 F.2d 205, 215 n.12 (9th Cir. 1964).
85. Huff v. Matson Navigation Co., 338 F.2d 205, 215 (9th Cir. 1964). For
other decisions which follow the more restrictive interpretation of the phrases
"loading" and "unloading," see Drumgold v. Plovba, 260 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Va.
1966); Daniel v. Skibs, A/S Hilda Knudsen, 253 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. Penn. 1966),
aff'd, 368 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1962); Partenweederei, M/S Belgrano v. Weigel,
299 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1962). Other holdings in line with the Fifth Circuit's
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Chagois involved a member of a dock crew working in a
boxcar from which rice was being discharged into the hold of
the ship through a marine leg. The opinion indicates that by
means of shovels and an electric auger which the plaintiff was
handling at the time of his accident, the loose rice was fed into
the hopper which moved the rice to the top of the elevator and
then into the ship's hold. Chagois was injured while he was holding the auger; the Fifth Circuit, noting that "Chagois's activities
in the boxcar were 'direct, necessary steps in the physical transfer' of the loose rice from the railroad cars on the pier into the
ship's hold," 86 held he was protected by the ship's warranty of
seaworthiness.
In Law, the court dealt with a member of a dock gang who
was operating a forklift truck, carrying cargo to a hookup point
alongside the S.S. Sagamore Hill. As he was operating the forklift, the overhead protection rack came loose and caused the
injuries sued upon. The court, in an opinion containing an extensive treatment of the development of this entire area, reversed the trial court and remanded for further proceedings
holding that the plaintiff was protected by the warranty of seaworthiness. The court concluded:
"We do not have here an accident occurring in some urban
enclave or pastoral pasture far removed from the pier. On
the contrary, Law's activities had proximity to and continuity with the job at hand-the task of loading cargo aboard
the Sagamore Hill. His specific job performance was so integrally woven into the entire loading operation that the
two cannot be separated except by the erection of hypertechnical and unrealistic legal barriers. If the terms 'loading' and 'unloading' are to be terms associated with reality
rather than mere conceptual microcosms without adjuncts
beyond the ship's beam, we have no choice but to conclude
that plaintiff Law was engaged in loading the Sagamore Hill.
We therefore hold that on the facts of this case ... plaintiff
8' 7
was within the scope of the warranty of seaworthiness.
As noted, the Law opinion attempts to draw some rough
decisions in Chagois and Law include Gebhard v. S.S. Hawaiian Legislator,
425 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1970); Hagans v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S. Co., 318
F.2d 563 (3d Cir. 1963); Olvera v. Michalos, 307 F. Supp. 9 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
86. 432 F.2d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 1971).

87. 432 F.2d 376, 385 (th Cir. 1971).
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boundaries around its extension of the warranty of seaworthiness to the facts of that case-"a longshoreman, intimately involved in the process of loading a vessel, injured as he moved
cargo from the back to the front of the dock."' 8 A recent decision
of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana has drawn the line. In Young v. Chevron Oil Co.,89 a
worker was injured when a land-based crane overturned in the
process of moving cargo from the dock to the storage area. The
evidence showed that the cargo had been unloaded from the
M/V Rough Tide at least one hour before plaintiff started his
work. Due to the lapse of time, his act was "not sufficiently
connected with the unloading of [the] vessel to make it a part
'
of the seaman's work. "
Violation of Longshoring Regulations as Negligence
and UnseaworthinessPer Se; Effect of Violations Upon
Comparative Negligence Defense
In Kernan v. American Dredging Co.,9 1 the United States
Supreme Court held that recovery under the Jones Act was
available for injuries or death resulting from the violation of
a statutory duty (in that case, a Coast Guard Regulation)
whether or not the character of the risk was that which the
statute was designed to guard against. The Court further precluded a finding of contributory negligence, employing the provisions of the Safety Appliances Act9 2 prescribing safety requirements for railway appliances and equipment which was incorporated into the FELA.1
In Provenza v. American Export Lines, Inc.,94 the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit adapted the Kernan reasoning to
hold that a standard of care could be established by reference
to safety regulations where plaintiff was a "Sieracki seaman.'
However, the question whether comparative negligence was
available as a defense to a longshoreman's action under the doctrine of unseaworthiness against the vessel and, if so, what rules
governed findings of comparative negligence, were left open.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
314 F. Supp. 1278 (E.D. La. 1970).
Id. at 1281.
355 U.S. 426 (1958).
45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1970).
45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
324 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1963).
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Several recent decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, however, have answered these questions.9 5
The Provenza case involved an injury caused by hatch beams
struck by a draft of cargo. The evidence indicated the accident
was caused by a combination of defective beams and a defective
winch. Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in refusing to
submit to the jury the "Safety and Health Regulations for Longshoring"9 6 as a basis for his claim of negligence and unseaworthiness. The Fourth Circuit approved the application of these regulations:
"... the plaintiff was entitled to have put before the jury
the definite standards set up in the regulations promulgated
by the Secretary of Labor defining reasonably safe conditions in the exact area involved in this case. Furthermore,
we are also forced to the conclusion that in the area covered
by the regulations their violation would render the ship
unseaworthy, and if such unseaworthiness was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, it would also render the
defendant shipowner liable. It follows, of course, that if the
jury should find that the stevedore had violated the regulations such conduct could also constitute negligence. If in
turn this negligent conduct of the stevedore were known,
or by the exercise of reasonable care should have been
known to the shipowner, and such negligence of the shipowner was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, then
he too would be liable to the plaintiff on the additional
grounds of negligence." 97
Among the numerous district court,98 court of appeals," and
state court'0 decisions allowing application of the regulations
F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 986 (1969). See text accompanying notes 102-110 infra.
95. Phipps v. S.S. Santa Maria, 418 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1969); Manning v.
M/V Sea Road, 417 F.2d 603 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding comparative fault doctri
applicable where unseaworthiness was result of violation of "Safety
and Health Regulations for Longshoring"); Neal v. Saga Shipping Co., 407
96. Safety and Health Regulations for Longshoring, 29 C.F.R. § 1504.1
(1971).
97. Provenza v. American Export Lines, Inc., 324 F.2d 660, 665 (4th Cir.
1963).
98. See, e.g., N. M. Paterson & Sons, Ltd. v. Nicholson Cleveland Terminal
Co., 323 F. Supp. 913, 916 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
99. See, eg., Reid v. Quebec Paper Sales & Transp. Co., 340 F.2d 34 (2d
Cir. 1965).
100. See, e.g., Cresap v. Pacific Inland Navigation Co., 478 P.2d 223 (Wash.
1970).
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was the Fifth Circuit decision in Marshall v. Isthmian Lines,
Inc., 101 which limited the full Kernan rule in the longshoreman's
area by requiring a showing that the regulation be designed to
protect against the particular hazard encountered. Three Fifth
Circuit decisions handed down in the last two years have established the application of the defense of comparative negligence
in this area, although liability is based upon a violation of a
safety regulation, and have limited the proportion of such comparative negligence to fifty per cent where a single violation is
proven to have caused the injury sued upon.102
The Neal decision involved an appeal from the trial court's
assessment of comparative negligence against the decedent in
the amount of fifty per cent. Plaintiff argued that since liability
was founded upon unseaworthiness brought about by a violation of certain Coast Guard regulations relative to damaged
bindings on bales of cotton, the defense of comparative negligence was not available for such a statutory violation. This
favored position was rejected as one reserved exclusively for
Jones Act seamen through the application of the FELA10 and
Safety Appliances Act. 10 4 The court said:
"The appellants' argument is based on the hypothesis that
the Jones Act applies to longshoremen and the resultant
conclusion that they are entitled to the protection of the
Federal Employer's Liability Act. But the premise itself
is faulty: on the very day the Supreme Court recognized
in Sieracki that the vessel owner owes a warranty of seaworthiness to longshoremen because the duty to provide a
seaworthy vessel extends to all who perform the ship's services, it held in Swanson v. Marra Brothers that a longshoreman cannot recover under the Jones Act from his employer, the stevedore, for injuries occurring while working
on a pier.
"Longshoremen are entitled to the warranty of seaworthiness. They are not entitled to the statutory remedy provided
by the Jones Act because they do not meet the requirements
of that Act. 'Sieracki does not abrogate the rule that the
101. 334 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1964).
102. Phipps v. S.S. Santa Maria, 418 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1969); Manning v.

M/V Sea Road, 417 F.2d 603 (5th Cir. 1969); Neal v. Saga Shipping Co., 407
F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 986 (1969).
103. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
104. Id. § 1-16.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

Jones Act applies only where the relationship of employer
and employee exists.'"105
In Manning v. M/V Sea Road,10 6 a longshoreman had fallen
through a manhole cover on the vessel a few hours before Manning had his accident, and Manning was aware of this. As he was
walking backwards directing a trucklift over a ramp, he fell
through the same manhole cover which had not been replaced.
Finding that a specific longshoring regulation had been violated
and that this violation was negligence per se, the court made
clear that negligence of this nature could be shown at trial on
the merits to create a condition of unseaworthiness. Accordingly, although Manning was found to have been negligent in
the first trial, the Fifth Circuit held that the fault would have to
be shared in view of the shipowner's violation of longshoring
regulations. 01
Further refinement of this rule was furnished by the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Phipps v. S.S. Santa Maria,0 8 where unseaworthiness of the vessel based upon violation of the safety regulations was found to be the cause of injury. The Fifth Circuit
applied Marshall and Manning, and further stated:
"As in Manning, it would in these circumstances defeat the
Congressional objective of achieving industrial safety to
permit the victim of flagrant violation as to beam locks to
bear more of a responsibility for this than the shipowner.
The maximum contributory negligence, attributableto claimant on this score would, therefore, be fifty per cent." (Emphasis added.) 01 9
Moreover, the court said that the lower court's assessment of
fifty per cent negligence ignored a second violation of the shipowner adduced by the evidence, and strongly indicated it felt the
latter should bear more than fifty per cent of the damages under
such conditions.
105. Neal v. Saga Shipping Co., 407 F.2d 481, 486 (5th Cir. 1969).
106. 417 F.2d 603 (5th Cir. 1969).
107. This opinion contains a full discussion of the applicable regulations.
Id. at 606-09, nn. 2-7. See also Kwarta v. United States Lines, Inc., 315 F. Supp.
112 (D.C. Md. 1970); Simmons v. Gulf & South Am. S.S. Co., 260 F. Supp. 525
(E.D. La. 1966), aff'd, 394 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1968).
108. 418 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1969).
109. Id. at 617.
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DEFENSES
Comparative Negligence ("ProportionateFault") Available
As Defense; Assumption of Risk Inapplicable
The general rule has been well stated by the Ninth Circuit
in Curry v. Fred Olsen Line:1 10
"The Federal rule in unseaworthiness cases is that contributory negligence is not a complete bar, but only serves to
mitigate damages."
Some degree of divergence exists between the rules as they
relate to actions under the Jones Act and those brought by longshoremen or Sieracki seamen; this divergence is most pronounced
in the area of violation of safety regulations. However, while the
defense of comparative negligence is available to respondents in
a longshoreman's action under the doctrine of unseaworthiness,
the defense of assumption of risk is not available, since "[n] either
a blue water seaman nor a Sieracki-sailor-longshoreman assumes
any risk of unseaworthiness."' Several opinions have treated the
distinctions between these two doctrines, such as that of the
Fourth Circuit in Bryant v. Partenreederei-ErnestRuss." 2 There
a ship ceiler lost his balance while attempting to force a warped
board into place by hammering on it. The Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court's assessment of fifty per cent comparative
negligence, stating:
".... we think there is no foundation in the record for a finding of contributory negligence. Concededly, in attempting
to hammer the board into place the appellant did only what
other workers in similar circumstances did habitually. The
District Court expressly found that the way in which Bryant
was performing his work was not in any way different from
the normal and customary manner in which such work was
conducted; that it often became necessary for a man to stand
on the hatch coaming to drive in the boards and that this
was customary procedure in fitting precut grain board. This
was not negligence, and to call it contributory negligence is
110. Curry v. Fred Olsen Line, 367 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1966). See also Palermo v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 355 U.S. 20 (1957); Neal v. Saga Shipping Co.,
S.A., 407 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1969). See NoRnis, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 44 (3d ed.
1970).
111. Neal v. Saga Shipping Co., 407 F.2d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 1969).
112. 352 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1965).
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tantamount to charging the plaintiff with assumption of risk
under another name."" 3
In the event plaintiff can show that he used an unseaworthy
part of a vessel in its defective condition at a time when he had
no choice but to use it as it was, 1 14 or if he continues to work
under conditions he knows to be hazardous but has no choice
except to work under these conditions, 115 the finder of fact may
properly reject the defense of contributory negligence altogether.
In Burrage v. Flota Mercante GrancolombianaS.A.,1 6 the Fifth
Circuit gave the following reasons for affirming a rejection of the
defense of contributory negligence where the worker continued
to work under unsafe conditions:
"In assaying the problem the trier is entitled to take into
consideration the realities of the situation, the economic dependence of the worker on continued employment, and the
law's general approach that in fostering industrial safety
the burden of noncompliance with standards of care is ordinarily placed directly on the employer, not wholly on the
injured victim. Manning v. M/V Searoad, 5 Cir., 1969, 417
F.2d 603, 1970 A.M.C. 145. It was reasonable under the circumstances for the workmen to continue working." 1 7
The Third Circuit case of Mroz v. Dravo Corp.,"" a proceeding under the Jones Act, contains language which seems to mix
notions of contributory negligence and the repudiated doctrine
of assumption of the risk. The court there said:" 9
"If a person by his own action subjects himself unnecessarily
to danger which should have been anticipated and is injured
thereby, he is guilty of contributory negligence."
The Burrage language, however, by emphasizing the "economic
realities of life" and placing the burden largely on the shipowner
or employer, seems to reject the reasoning found in Mroz.
Some vague boundaries may be delimited by consulting the
113. Id.

at 615-16.

114. San Pedro Compania Armadoras, S.A. v. Yannacopoulos, 357 F.2d
737 (5th Cir. 1966).
115. Burrage v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 431 F.2d 1229 (5th

Cir. 1970).
116.
117.
118.
119

Id.
Id. at 1232.
429 F.2d 1156 (3d Cir. 1970).
Id.
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language in an earlier decision of the Third Circuit, Klimaszewski
v. Pacafic-Atlantic Steamship Co., Inc.,120 where it was said:
"In nearly every occupation, there is some inherent and unavoidable risk which does not arise out of negligence or defective equipment . . .but seamen and longshoremen do not
assume the types of risks which caused injury to plaintiff
in this case, namely, negligence of another or a vessel which
is unseaworthy.' 121
The Ninth Circuit has noted the importance of alternative
courses of action to those available to the injured party in determining his contributory negligence. That court, in DuBose v.
Matson Navigation Co., 122 observed that "the concept of contributory negligence becomes operative only when alternative courses
of action are available to the injured party and he chooses the
unreasonable course." It should be noted that the Court in Mroz,
citing Dubose, attempted to delimit its language with reference
to contributory negligence by noting that the general rule would
apply where it was found as a fact that plaintiff had the possibility of securing relief by informing his superiors of any unsafe
conditions, but continued to work without doing so.
The Usner Decision-A Single Negligent Act of Longshoremen
Causing Instantaneous Injuries Is Insufficient to
Constitute Unseaworthiness
Before Usner, the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits had
held that the negligent act of a fellow longshoreman using safe
and proper equipment could render the vessel unseaworthy. 128
The Fifth Circuit, in accord with the Ninth Circuit, had rejected
this theory of "instant unseaworthiness," holding that the operational negligence of a longshoreman occurring at the moment of
injury to a co-worker did not render the vessel unseaworthy. 124
This conflict between the circuits which existed before January 25, 1971, was settled when the Court handed down its fivefour decision on that date in the case of Usner v. Luckenbach
25
Overseas Corp.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

246 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1957).
Id. at 877.
403 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1968).
Note, 2 J. OF MARITIME L. & COm. 871 (1971).
Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 91 S.Ct. 514, 516 n.2 (1971).
Id.
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The facts indicated that Usner was engaged in loading operations in the Port of New Orleans on a barge moored alongside
the S.S. Edgar F. Luckenbach. His job was to break out bundles
of cargo by securing the cargo to a sling attached to the fall each
time it was lowered from the ship's boom by the winch operator.
At one time Usner found the sling beyond his reach and motioned to the flagman standing on the deck of the ship to direct
the winch operator to lower the fall. The winch operator lowered the fall too fast and it struck petitioner, causing the injuries
sued upon. The Supreme Court eliminated from its consideration any difficulty with the winch, boom, fall, sling or any other
equipment or appurtenances of the ship, its cargo or its crew.
After discussing various examples of unseaworthiness which
have been set forth earlier in this Article, the Court pointed out
that Usner's injury was caused by:
"... the isolated, personal negligent act of the petitioner's
fellow longshoremen. To hold that his individual act of negligence rendered the ship unseaworthy would be to subvert
the fundamental distinction between unseaworthiness and
negligence ...". 12

6

The Usner opinion stressed the divorcement of unseaworthiness
from principles of negligence. It emphasized that unseaworthiness was a condition and characterized the manner in which that
condition came into being as "quite irrelevant to the owner's
12
liability.'
One writer has predicted that a consequence of this decision
will be the attempt by plaintiffs' attorneys to show that their
clients' injuries resulted from a continuing, dangerous "condition."'128 This attempt will necessarily perpetuate the employment of a "time test" to determine how long before the injury
the "operational negligence" occurred in order to decide whether
a "condition" existed. Such a problem is found in Trawler
Racer 129 and its progeny, which eliminated any consideration of
"notice" to the shipowner as a prerequisite for a finding of unseaworthiness. For instance, in Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Service, 80 the Fifth Circuit held that "an appreciable length of time"
126. Id. at 518.
127. Id. at 517.
128. Note, 2 J. OF MARrIME: LAW & COM. 871 (1971).
129. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
130. 412 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1969).
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had passed since the occurrence of the negligent act and a "condition" had resulted from the prior negligence. 18 ' In Dillon v.
M. S. Oriental Inventor,5 2 an "unseaworthy man" case, the
court said:
"The impairment to Lewis' knee was a condition which had
existed for over five hours at the time of the injury. It indicated that Lewis lacked the reasonably necessary fitness for
the task at hand. Therefore, it was not clear error for the
trial court to have found that Lewis' return to work after he
injured his knee introduced an unseaworthy condition under
the circumstances of this case."',"
Usner itself required an examination of the theoretically
prohibited time element, and notions of "notice" and negligence
were injected into the decision when the Court made the following statement in concluding its opinion:
"In Trawler Racer, supra, there existed a condition of unseaworthiness, and we held it was error to require a finding
of negligent conduct in order to hold the shipowner liable.
The case before us presents the other side of the same coin.
For it would be equally erroneous here, where no condition
of unseaworthiness existed, to hold the shipowner liable for
a third party's single and wholly unforeseeable act of neg'8 4
ligence. '
Moreover, the "Sieracki-seaman" has once again been accorded a lesser status than a true seaman, for the court implied
that instantaneous negligence of a member of the ship's crew
causing the same injuries might have called for a different result.
It was careful to point out, by way of footnote, that "no member
of the ship's crew was in any way involved in this case. '' l a
The Court has repeatedly held that injuries caused by a seaman with vicious proclivities (instantaneously) are covered by
the doctrine of unseaworthiness.13 6 The reason for this inconsistency has been suggested by one commentator'8 to be "consid131. Id. at 1032.
132. 426 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1970).
133. Id. at 979-80.
134. 91 S.Ct. 514, 518 (1971).
135. Id. n.18.
136. See Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955), and authorities cited therein.
137. Note, 31 LA. L. REv. 650 (1971).
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erations of equitable treatment for the shipowner who has no
control over the competence of stevedores."18 8 It would appear
the Court had such factors in mind when it spoke of the erroneous
result which would follow from holding a shipowner liable for
a "third party's" 13 9 act of negligence.
Application of the Equitable Doctrine of Laches to
Actions for Unseaworthiness
What period of limitations governs the longshoreman's action
against the vessel? The cases have considered the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum
Co.'40 to stand for the proposition that the general maritime law
doctrine of laches applied, with the three-year period of limitations set forth in the analogous provisions of the Jones Act to be
used as a guideline.1 4' As said in Banks v. United States Lines
Co.' 42 "McAllister has effectively invoked a three-year limitation
as to a personal injury action predicated upon unseaworthiness."43
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Giddens v. Isbrandtsen Co.'
set forth the following definition of "laches":
"Laches is sustainable only on proof of both of two elements:
'(1) lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the
defense.' ,,144
The decisions have established a presumption of prejudice
to a respondent with respect to a claim for damages based on
unseaworthiness asserted more than three years after the cause
of action has arisen, under which the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut this presumption. 45 The Fifth Circuit has treated
146
this area in Flowers v. Savannah Machine and Foundry Co.,
which rejected reference to the state period of limitation in favor
of employing the Jones Act period of three years. Noting the
138.
139.
140.
141.
1968).
142.
143.
144.
145.
1962).
146.

Id. at 659.
Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 91 S.Ct. 514 (1971).
McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958).
See, e.g., Banks v. United States Lines Co., 293 F. Supp. 62 (E.D. Va.
Id. at 66.
Giddens v. Isbrandsten Co., 355 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 127.
Flowers v. Savannah Machine & Foundry Co., 310 F.2d 135 (5th Cir.
Id.
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wide disparity between the periods of limitation in the six maritime states comprising the Fifth Circuit, the court stated:
"And now, whether the case is in the federal court on the
law side or the admiralty side or in a state court, federal
147
maritime standards are solely controlling."'
A recent decision of the Ninth Circuit, King v. Alaska Steamship
Co., 148 reaches a similar result. This decision, like that in Flowers,
was based upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court
14
The
in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Translatantique.
court reasoned that under the Kermarec doctrine the legal rights
and liabilities arising from the conduct in question in these suits
are measurable by standards of maritime law."'
Maritime Rights Control Over State Law Defenses
In a recent decision of the Fifth Circuit, the Burrage case,' 5'
the shipowner urged the substituted employer bar of Section 6 of
the Louisiana Compensation Act. That section provides that if
the work being done for a principal by a contractor is part of the
principal's "trade, business or occupation," the principal is liable
to pay compensation to any employee of the contractor. 52 If that
test is met, the exclusivity provision of the Act' 5 3 comes into play
to cut off any damage suit claim. The court decided that this state
principle, which would be a bar to effectual enforcement of the
maritime right, cannot constitutionally be applied since it would
work material prejudice to the characteristic features of the
general maritime law and would interfere with the proper uniformity of that law contrary to article 3, section 2 of the Con54
stitution.
CONCLUSION
While the tides ran fast in the past year in favor of the longshoremen in the "loading - unloading" area treated in Chagois
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 138.
431 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1970).
358 U.S. 625 (1959).
See also Larios v. victory Carriers, Inc., 316 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1963).
Burrage v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 431 F.2d 1229 (5th

Cir. 1970).
152. LA. R.S. 23:1061 (1950).
153. Id. at § 1032.
154. See also Bagrowski v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 440
F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1971).
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and Law, Usner is one of most limiting decisions to be rendered
by the United States Supreme Court in the area of longshoremen's remedies. The expansion process culminating in Chagois
and Law has brought cries for congressional action such as that
voiced by the Court in Forkin.155 That legislation is now pending
in Congress and would eliminate the longshoreman's action
against the vessel while effecting an increase in his weekly benefits under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act. 156
While this legislation has been deemed necessary by the
shipping industry and its representatives, the plaintiffs' bar views
it as a frustration of the "humanitarian motivations" which
prompted the decisions in Sieracki and its progeny. Although
the prospects for passage of this legislation are uncertain at the
time of this writing, the legislative restrictions on longshoremen's rights under consideration will result, if enacted, in large
part from the fact that the warranty of seaworthiness, in the
words of a Louisiana Court of Appeal opinion in this area, "has
been taken upon the judicial anvil and hammered into an unexpected shape."'157
155. Forkin v. Furness, Withy & Co., 323 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1968).
156. S.525, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 247, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
157. Jackson v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 185 So.2d 342, 345 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1966).

